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ABSTRACT
DEFAULT EFFECTS IN THE ENDORSEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES
Blake J. Bent
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Philip Langlais

When making decisions, people are often presented with a default option. Across many
different domains, individuals show an inflated preference for the default option, a
phenomenon known as the default effect. The current research examined the default
effect and the role o f loss aversion and implied endorsement in the context of
environmental policy. Two hundred nineteen undergraduate participants were asked to
vote on an ostensible ballot question regarding the enactment of seven environmental
policies. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f three conditions based on a
manipulation o f the default option: a default to enact the policy (the opt-out condition), a
default to not enact the policy (the opt-in condition), and a forced-choice control
condition. The current study found default effects to be present for three o f the seven
policies. O f these three policies, participants in the opt-out default condition endorsed
the policy more often than participants in the opt-in or forced-choice condition. This
pattern o f results supports the endowment effect (i.e., an extension o f loss aversion) as an
explanation o f default effects, but an explicit measure o f loss aversion did not.
Perceptions o f policymaker endorsement did not differ across default conditions and
political affiliation did not predict voting behavior.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Climate change and sustainability are growing concerns in the United States and
around the world. Experts have estimated that the current rate of climate change could
have devastating effects. Unique ecosystems are being threatened, extreme weather
events are becoming increasingly likely, and millions o f people could be affected by
coastal flooding, diminished water supply, and adverse health consequences (Smith et al.,
2009). As a result, many government entities are enacting policies that push its citizens
to “go green.” According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), environmental
policy at the state or local level (hereafter labeled green policy) has the ability to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, increase energy security, reduce air pollution, aid economic
development, and improve overall quality o f life (US EPA, 2012).
The benefits o f green policy, as outlined by the EPA, do not come without costs.
As with many government-run programs, the expense o f environmental protection and
conservation are covered by the taxpayer. Funding government-sponsored environmental
initiatives without cutting other programs requires an increase in taxes. Future savings
are possible, but not without an initial increase in cost. For example, in 2007 the United
States government passed the Energy Independence and Security Act which raised the
efficiency requirements o f light bulbs. Many consumers opted to buy compact
fluorescent lights (CFLs) which have a higher price tag than the traditional incandescent
bulbs. The extended lifespan and increased efficiency o f CFLs produce savings over
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time; however, these benefits are still subject to an initial cost (US EPA, 2011). In sum,
the passing o f any green policy is subject to an analysis o f costs and benefits.
Contrary to theories in economics which state that decisions are based on rigid
analysis o f costs and benefits (such as theories by Leonard Savage as cited in Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979), recent evidence from psychology suggests that a variety o f situational
contexts are capable o f influencing an individual’s preferences and decisions (for a
review see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
demonstrated that a preference for a pair o f medical treatments with identical outcomes
hinged critically on whether the outcomes were worded in terms o f lives saved or lives
lost. In their study o f a hypothetical foreign disease that infected 600 people, two groups
o f participants were given the following scenarios:

Group 1: Treatment A guarantees that 200 people will be saved. Treatment B has
a 1/3 probability o f saving 600 people and a 2/3 probability o f saving no one.
Group 2: Treatment C guarantees that 400 people will die. Treatment D has a 1/3
probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.

Treatments A and C, as well as B and D, have equivalent outcomes. However,
participants in group 1 favored treatment A, while participants in group 2 favored
treatment D (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Expected utility theory, which is based only
on costs, benefits, and probabilities, was not able to account for reversal o f preferences
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment is just one o f many
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examples o f how decisions are influenced by more than a mathematical cost-benefit
analysis (for other examples see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Evidence from the field o f neuroscience also supports the view that individuals do
not make decisions solely based on hard and fast calculations. For example, in a review
o f the moral judgment literature, Greene and Haidt (2002) found that moral decisions are
largely driven by emotions. Additionally, emotional centers o f the brain can impact
decision making, even when these decisions are largely economic in nature. Damasio
(1996) suggested that emotional events (somatic markers) work in concert with explicit
cognition to inform decision making. This hypothesis still drives many o f the theories
about the roles o f emotions in decision making (Reimann & Bechara, 2010).
Understanding how humans construct their preferences and make decisions can
significantly alter the future o f the environment. According to a recent report by the
California Council on Science and Technology (2011), by 2050 California could achieve
emissions rates that are 60 percent below the levels from 1990 by using technology that is
currently available. Although this estimate is unique to California, technological
innovations are not sufficient for changing the environment. Human decision making is
ultimately responsible for implementation o f these innovations. The current study
examined how one aspect of constructed preferences, default effects, impacted
endorsement o f environmental policies.
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CHAPTER II
EXPLANATIONS OF DEFAULT EFFECTS

STATUS QUO BIAS
Individuals have been shown to have an inflated preference for the status quo
(Anderson, 2003). Under certain circumstances a preference for the status quo is
beneficial. For example, an individual may genuinely prefer the status quo or deviations
from the status quo may require high transaction costs (Anderson, 2003). In these cases,
a preference for the status quo is a perfectly rational behavior. However, individuals
often select the status quo even when this is a suboptimal decision (Samuelson &
Zeckhauser, 1988). For example, Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) studied the health
plans o f Harvard professors in the 1980s. The professors were able to switch healthcare
plans yearly at minimal cost. An overwhelming number o f professors, however,
continued with the same plan year after year. This alone does not necessarily reflect a
bias, but the authors compared the choices o f long-term enrollees to the selections made
by new enrollees. New enrollees are presumably free from a status quo bias having not
previously selected a plan. Therefore, the new enrollees served as a control group to
gauge an objective level o f preference from year to year. In the early portion o f the
decade, Blue Cross Blue Shield was heavily favored by the majority o f professors.
However, as the years progressed and other plans were added, the balance began to shift
towards different healthcare plans. The change in selection resulted mostly from new
enrollees; current professors rarely switched to new plans. Assuming that the new
enrollees provided an objective evaluation o f the healthcare plans, and after controlling
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for the age o f the participants, a status quo bias still persisted in the face o f suboptimal
choices (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).
DEFAULT EFFECTS AND THE OMISSION BIAS
When individuals are presented with a set o f choices, the decision maker
commonly has the option to take no action. In many non-trivial decisions, individuals
prefer to take no action. This effect has been labeled an omission bias (Spranca, Minsk,
& Baron, 1991). Spranca, Minsk, and Baron (1991) found that omissions were viewed as
more morally justifiable compared to commissions (actions). Initially, the status quo bias
and omission bias were thought to be confounded (Ritov & Baron, 1992), and in many
cases these biases do act in conjunction with one another; taking no action (i.e., the
omission bias) will lead to no change in the current state o f affairs (i.e., the status quo).
However, these biases have been shown to be distinct from one another (Schweitzer,
1994). For example, if changes are imminent then taking no action will lead to a new
state (i.e., deviation from the status quo).
A preference for no action, often coupled with a preference for the status quo,
leads many individuals to select the default option. The default is the option that an
individual will receive if he or she does not explicitly state otherwise. Defaults have
been shown to have significant impacts on preferences. For example, Johnson, Bellman,
and Lohse (2002) included a check box at the end o f an online survey asking participants
if they could be contacted about future surveys. The default o f the check box varied. In
one condition, participants had to check the box if they wished to be contacted in the
future; if they did nothing then they would not be contacted. In the second condition,
participants had to check the box if they did not want to be contacted in the future; if they

did nothing then they would be contacted. The researchers found the level o f future
participants was largely dependent upon the default option. More participants were
contacted for future surveys in the second condition where they had to check the box in
order to not be contacted (Johnson et al., 2002). Psychologists refer to this pattern o f
decisions as a default effect.
The selection o f the default can a have very meaningful impact. Johnson and
Goldstein (2003) examined the effect o f defaults on organ donation both in the United
States and Europe. In the United States, a large discrepancy was observed between the
approval rating o f organ donation and the actual percentage o f Americans who are organ
donors. The authors hypothesized that this difference was due to the fact that in the
United States donors must explicitly indicate their desire to be organ donors. That is, the
default for organ donation is to not be a donor. In an experiment manipulating the
default, rates o f organ donation were significantly higher when participants had to opt out
o f the organ donation program compared to a condition that had participants opt into the
program (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). A comparison o f actual organ donation rates in
European countries indicated that countries with opt-out policies had significantly higher
rates o f organ donation than countries with opt-in policies. The discrepancy found in the
real world data was even stronger than the discrepancy in the experimental manipulation
(Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Default effects also become evident when decision makers are allowed to make
multiple selections. For example, Park, Jun, and Maclnnis (2000) instructed participants
to imagine the purchase o f an automobile and indicate which options they would include.
In this study, the decisions took two forms. H alf o f the participants were presented with a

fully loaded car and asked to eliminate the options that they did not prefer. Alternatively,
other participants were initially presented with a base model and asked to indicate the
options that they preferred to add on. The default in the first scenario was to include
every option, while the default in the second scenario was to not include any additional
options. Participants in the fully-loaded default condition consistently preferred more
options and paid more money than those in the base model condition (Park et al., 2000).
The effects o f defaults in multi-selection decision scenarios extend beyond
automobile purchases. These effects were observed with other consumer items such as
computers, treadmills (Park et al., 2000), and pizza (Levin, Schreiber, Lauriola, & Gaeth,
2002). Additionally, a group of geriatric patients opted for more end-of-life treatments
when instructed to indicate the treatments they wanted withheld rather than the treatments
they wanted to be provided (Kressel, Chapman, & Leventhal, 2007).
These results suggest that default effects may have serious implications on how
the public will vote on environmental policies. Advocates, opposition groups, and
policymakers need to be aware o f these consequences when selecting defaults. When it
comes to green policy, defaults have the ability to promote or inhibit environmentally
friendly action. Policymakers can use this information to advance or prevent the
adoption o f green policy based on how they construct the available options— a process
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) refer to as “libertarian paternalism.”
Two notable studies have demonstrated the ability o f defaults to impact ecofriendly action. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) found that the preference for green
energy (e.g., solar, wind, hydro, etc.) over “grey” energy (i.e., coal powered) was
associated with green default options. Data from energy companies in two German cities

indicated that citizens generally opted for the default green energy when other options
became available. In one instance the default effect persisted in a city where citizens had
recently displayed opposition to green energy. In the other natural experiment, citizens
refused to switch energy options, even when alternatives were cheaper and no switching
costs would be incurred. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) also found default effects in
two lab studies which compared green and grey defaults. Preferences for green energy
were consistently higher when green energy, as opposed to grey energy, was the default.
Similarly, an experiment by Dinner, Johnson, Goldstein, and Liu (2011) found
that a preference for incandescent light bulbs or CFLs is largely influenced by the default
option. Participants were given a backstory about renovations to their home. The critical
manipulation was that the contractor had either installed incandescent bulbs or CFLs in
the home. Participants were asked if they wished for the contractor to replace the bulbs
free o f charge. When CFLs were the default option (i.e., already installed) compared to
an incandescent bulb default, participants were more likely to choose CFLs.
In order to more fully understand the default effects on green policy, it is
necessary to examine the factors contributing to these effects. O f the many factors
identified (Dinner et al., 2011), effort, implied endorsement, and reference dependence
have received the most attention.
EFFORT
The effort explanation proposes that taking no action requires less cognitive or
physical energy than taking action (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003). Deciding on an option
other than the default may involve a series o f taxing calculations or taking physical action

such as filling out a form or making a phone call. The disproportionate selection of the
default presumably stems from the fact that default choices are simply easier.
Johnson and Goldstein (2003), who examined the rates of organ donation cited
above, hypothesized that effort contributed to the disparity between their experimental
and observational results. Default effects were present in both cases, but the real-world
data (i.e. the results o f the observational study) showed a stronger divide between organ
donation rates in opt-in vs. opt-out countries. The physical effort required in the
experiment was simply to click a computer mouse. However, to actually change your
organ donation preference in the real world requires filling out paperwork and sending
mail.
IMPLIED ENDORSEMENT
Implied endorsement posits that decision makers infer that the default condition
was selected because o f its greater value, and that those who set the default are
recommending this option. The default effect occurs because decision makers rely on
this recommendation when making a choice. Implied endorsement is thought to be
especially important in socially charged decisions (McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein,
2006).
McKenzie, Liersch, and Finkelstein (2006) systematically examined the implied
endorsement hypothesis in a series o f experiments. In Experiment 1, the authors
instructed participants to act as state officials and select a default policy for organ
donation. Participants chose between two policies where the default was either being an
organ donor or not being an organ donor. The resulting policy selections were found to
be related to the participants’ willingness to be an organ donor as well as their general
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attitudes towards organ donation. Those who indicated that they were willing to be an
organ donor were significantly more likely to set organ donation as the default policy
than those who indicated that they were not willing to be an organ donor. Additionally,
participants who thought that other people ought to be organ donors were more likely to
set organ donation as the default policy compared to participants who thought other
people should not be organ donors (McKenzie et al., 2006).
Experiment 2 examined what participants inferred about policymakers based on
the default organ donation policy. Participants were more likely to infer that
policymakers were willing to be organ donors when the default policy was “organ donor”
compared to “not an organ donor.” Also, those in the “organ donor” default condition
were more likely to infer that policymakers believed other people ought to be organ
donors compared to those in the “not a donor” default condition. (McKenzie et al., 2006).
Together, these studies indicate that policymakers’ preferences may their selection o f a
default (Experiment 1) and that other people actively make inferences about these
preferences (Experiment 2).
Additional evidence has come from consumer research. Brown and Krishna
(2004) presented participants with products that came with three customizable categories,
e.g., a computer with different available keyboards, monitors, and hard drives. Each
product category had two options, high quality and high price versus low quality and low
price. The experimenters manipulated which o f these options was set as the default (high
or low) as well as the amount o f information that the participants received about the
seller. In the limited information condition, participants were provided with a simple
description o f the retailer. In addition to the retailer description, participants in the
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enhanced information condition read a paragraph indicating that the seller was a
reputable organization yet was in jeopardy o f going out of business.
Compared to a forced-choice control condition (participants chose a product
option but no default was identified) participants in the high default condition chose the
more expensive option more often. However, in the enhanced information condition, this
effect was not present. The researchers reasoned that the default option influenced
choices by providing information about the marketer. Specifically, when the retailer was
threatened with going out o f business, the consumers were motivated to generate reasons
why the marketer might be setting the default as the more expensive option (Brown &
Krishna, 2004). There is no explicit evidence that the participants in the limited
information condition used the default option as an unbiased recommendation. However,
the results in the enhanced information condition do indicate that defaults have the ability
to carry information about those who set them.
REFERENCE DEPENDENCE
The reference dependence explanation o f default effects draws from prospect
theory, which hinges on the notion that gains and losses are not viewed in absolute terms,
but rather as deviations from a reference point. Additionally, the value function for gains
and losses are not equivalent (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
As can be seen from Figure 1, the value function for losses is steeper than it is for gains.
This discrepancy is due to a human tendency towards loss aversion: people see more
negativity in a loss o f x value than they see positivity in a gain of x value. Initial
evidence for this phenomenon came from an examination o f individuals’ preferences in a
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Subjective vahie

Losses Gains

Figure 1. A theoretical value function according to prospect theory.

series o f gambles. Decision makers consistently opted to take risks to avoid a loss, but
were unwilling to take equivalent risks to enhance a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Loss aversion explains default effects by assuming the default to be the reference
point. Any option other than the default is evaluated in terms of losses or gains.
Deviations from the default can have both positive and negative effects, but because
losses are weighted more heavily than gains, the positive deviations are generally voided
by negative deviations. A related line o f research on consumer behavior has suggested an
endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) that refers to an imbalance between money that people
are willing to pay (WTP) for a product and the amount that people are willing to accept
(WTA) to sell a product (WTA > WTP). For example, in an experiment by Knetsch
(1989), participants were initially given two candy bars or two dollars. Participants
endowed with the candy bars were asked the minimum dollar amount they would accept
to sell their candy. Likewise, participants endowed with the money were asked how
much money they were willing to pay for the candy bars. The average value given to the
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candy bars by those endowed with them was much higher (M = $ 1.38) than those
endowed with money (M = $0.90). Similar to default effects, loss aversion is able to
explain this preference for an initial endowment. The thought of giving up an item drives
up its perceived value (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991).
An extension o f these ideas is that people generally focus on what they are giving
up. In the context o f purchasing tickets to a basketball game, Carmon and Ariely (2000)
showed that sellers generally assessed value based on what they would be surrendering
by selling the ticket (e.g., the importance o f the game). Conversely, buyers traditionally
are surrendering money in a transaction, so their focus was based on monetary concerns.
Not only did the two groups display dissimilar attitudes towards value assessment, but
manipulating aspects o f the transaction affected the two groups differently. Changes in
monetary conditions (e.g., the sticker price o f a ticket) had stronger effects on buyers than
sellers; changes in items conditions (e.g., the atmosphere o f the crowd at the game) had a
stronger effect on sellers than buyers.
Reference dependence and its byproducts o f loss aversion and the endowment
effect have been displayed in previous research on green defaults. Dinner et al. (2011)
found that reference dependence was a key contributor to the selection o f incandescent
bulbs or CFLs. Furthermore, Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008) found that participants
required much more money to give up green energy than participants were willing to pay
for green energy. This willingness to pay/willingness to accept discrepancy supports the
endowment effect. However, when asked to explicitly state the reasons for their
decisions (e.g., cost, environmental impact, etc.), no differences were found between
conditions.
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Each o f the preceding mechanisms (effort, implied endorsement, and reference
dependence) is capable o f producing default effects and there is no evidence to suggest
that they are mutually exclusive. The default option may require less effort, be perceived
as highly recommended, and focus individuals on losses rather than gains. The more
likely scenario, however, is that some of these mechanisms are more prevalent than
others depending on the context. In order to understand how default effects operate in the
evaluation o f green policy, the impact o f each o f these mechanisms must be measured.
The current study looked at default effects in green policy, the nature o f how they
operate, and their impact on potential voters’ preferences. Past research has studied the
effect o f defaults on environmentally friendly behavior (Dinner et al., 2011; Pichert &
Katsikopoulos, 2008), but the current study adds to the current literature in three ways.
First, this experiment is not based on tangible and immediate outcomes, but instead on
policies with future impact. For example, rather than investigating how a house’s current
light bulb affects a preference for incandescent or CFL bulbs (Dinner et al., 2011), the
current study examined how defaults potentially impact the preference for a light bulb
efficiency mandate. Additionally, past research has often been limited to dichotomous
choices (e.g., incandescent vs. CFL), but the current study measured the default effects in
multi-faceted decisions (i.e., the decision makers are able to make multiple selections).
This form o f default research has been limited to the domain of consumer behavior
(Levin et al., 2002; Park et al., 2000), but the current study extends the multi-choice
paradigm to environmental decision making. Finally, the current study explored the
impact o f environmental loss versus monetary loss to see which o f these factors has a
larger influence on the preferences for green policies.
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CHAPTER III
PREDICTIONS

The current study asked participants to indicate their preferences for a series o f
green policies and their associated costs. The critical manipulation is the nature o f the
default. In one condition, the participants were presented with an array o f policies and
asked to indicate which programs they want to be enacted (the opt-in condition).
Participants in the other condition were presented with the same set o f policies but told to
indicate which policies they do not wish to be enacted (the opt-out condition). A control
condition did not have a default. Participants in the control condition were asked to
indicate their preference to either enact or eliminate each presented policy (forcedchoice).
These differences in defaults are predicted to lead to differential preferences in the
number o f endorsed green policies. Specifically, participants in the opt-out condition are
willing to endorse more policies (and thus spend more o f their tax dollars) than
participants in the opt-in condition. Reference dependence is expected to be the key
contributor to this explanation. Because o f the nature o f the task, physical effort, as
described by Johnson and Goldstein (2003), was not measured. The current experiment
does not offer a meaningful comparison group, so measuring effort would not lead to any
substantial conclusions. Implied endorsement (McKenzie et al., 2006) is expected to
differ across conditions. Policymakers in the opt-out condition will be seen as favoring
green policies more than those in the opt-in condition. This difference is expected to be
small, however, because in both conditions the policymakers are presenting voters with
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green initiatives. In other words, even though the opt-in condition has a default o f no
action, legislators would have to be involved for the policies to make it to a ballot.
Therefore, differences in implied endorsement are expected to explain minimal amounts
o f variance in the number of preferred green policies.
For reference dependence to adequately explain default effects in green policy,
participants must be focused on the losses in each condition. According to Carmon and
Ariely (2000), loss aversion leads to a “focus on the forgone.” The forgone aspect in the
opt-out condition is environmental benefits while the forgone in the opt-in condition is
money. Therefore, the loss o f environmental benefits should have a greater influence on
participants in the opt-out condition compared to the opt-in condition. Alternatively,
those in the opt-in condition are predicted to be more influenced by monetary losses than
those in the opt-out condition. In sum, the proposed study makes the following
predictions:
Hi: Participants in the opt-out condition will vote for more environmental
programs, and thus be willing to spend more in taxes, than participants in the optin condition.
H 2 : Participants in the opt-out condition will perceive the policy makers as more
strongly endorsing green initiatives than participants in the opt-in condition.
H 3 : Participants in the opt-out condition will report a stronger influence o f
environmental effects on their decisions compared to participants in the opt-in
condition. Participants in the opt-in condition report a stronger influence o f the
monetary cost on their decisions compared to participants in the opt-out condition.
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HU: The effects o f loss aversion, as measured by the reported influence o f
monetary and environmental concern, will explain more variance among
conditions than implied endorsement.
Each o f these hypotheses comes with a caveat. In matters o f green policy, one
important factor that cannot be overlooked is political affiliation. Although default
effects have been found to be robust across multiple experimental and observational
areas, the effects can be diminished when the decision maker has particularly strong
emotions towards the domain (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Previous research found
that Democrats are more willing than Republicans to support green policy (Aldy,
Kotchen, & Leiserowitz, 2012; O’Connor, Bord, Yamal, & Wiefek, 2002). Additionally,
Republicans and Independents have been shown to be less willing to support green policy
when the expenditures are labeled as “taxes” (the methodology used for the current
study) as opposed to “offset” (Hardisty, Johnson, & Weber, 2010). Due to these findings,
political party affiliation is expected to interact with the default effects. Participants were
asked to identify their affiliation in order to examine a possible interaction.
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CHAPTER IV
METHOD

PARTICIPANTS
The final sample consisted o f 219 undergraduate students (58.40% female) who
completed the experimental task in exchange for research credit. All eligible students
also had the opportunity to complete similar tasks for equivalent credit. Each participant
was issued a unique identification number by the Department of Psychology in order to
administer research credit. These numbers were recorded by the experimenter but were
not linked to individual data. Because responses remained anonymous, a review
committee in the College o f Sciences classified the study as exempt. The mean age o f
participants was 20.68 years (SD = 5.04); ten participants did not report their age.
Among all participants, 94 were Democrats, 51 were Republican, and 74 did not affiliate
with either party. Participants’ responses remained anonymous although
MEASURES
Implied endorsement. Implied endorsement was measured with an item adapted
from McKenzie et al. (2006). Participants indicated their level of agreement using a 7
point scale from -3 (completely disagree) to 3 (completely agree) with the following
statement: I voted for the policies that I did because I felt like the policymakers wanted
me to select these options. In previous studies this item was able to detect significant
differences in implied endorsement across default conditions (McKenzie et al., 2006;
Dinner et al., 2011)
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Reference dependence. In order to assess reference dependence, the current
study employed methods consistent with the account o f loss aversion endorsed by
Carmon and Ariely (2000). Participants were asked to indicate how much their responses
were driven by both monetary and environmental concerns. Specifically, participants
were asked how much o f their decision was influenced by the environmental benefits of
the policy and the cost o f the policy. Participants indicated their responses by dragging
sliders on scales from

0

to

100

to indicate the influence o f the environmental benefits and

costs independently.
Political affiliation. The measure o f political affiliation followed from Hardisty
et al. (2009) by asking participants to indicate if they identify as Democrat, Republican,
or none o f the above.
Ballot question. Preferences for green policy were assessed by participants’
“votes” on an ostensible Virginia state ballot questionnaire. The questionnaire contained
a series o f environmental policies and their associated annual costs to the citizens.
Participants were instructed to check a box if they were in favor o f passing the policy.
Three versions o f the questionnaire were presented which represented three levels o f the
primary independent variable (i.e., opt-in, opt-out, and forced-choice). One group o f
participants saw an empty checkbox next to the policy. Another group saw the checkbox
already checked. Finally, the control group was presented with a forced-choice ballot.
That is, these participants were instructed to indicate a yes or a no for each policy.
The Virginia state ballot questionnaire was developed through an online search
for environmental policies that are either implemented or under consideration in
municipalities across the United States. This search generated a list o f seven potential

environmental policies. In many cases, policies included actual or estimated costs to
taxpayers. For some policies, a “ballpark” cost was generated by the investigator using
per capita cost estimates. For example, the cost o f eco-fees was estimated by dividing the
revenue from eco-fees in British Columbia (where the program is already in place) by the
population o f the province. These policies were then examined by members o f a local
environmental protection organization. The members o f the environmental protection
organization independently rated each policy across a number of categories in order to
validate the measurement instrument. Categories included the following: the policy
addresses a real environmental issue; the policy could be implemented by a state or local
government; the policy would have a positive environmental impact; the cost is a
reasonable “ballpark” estimate; implementation o f the policy will result in an increased
cost. The subject matter experts showed high levels o f agreement in nearly every
category for each proposed policy (see Table 1 for complete results). Full descriptions of
the policies and their associated costs, as shown to the participants, are listed in the
Appendix.
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Table 1
Mean Expert Ratings by Policy and Validation Criterion
Real
Positive
Issue
Gov’t
Impact
Recycling
4.50
4.17
4.33

Estimate
3.33

Cost
4.17

Green Mileage

4.83

3.50

4.00

3.17

4.83

Lighting

4.33

3.17

3.50

3.50

4.17

Storm Water

5.00

4.83

5.00

3.50

4.50

Compost

4.33

4.17

4.17

2.83

4.33

Carbon Tax

4.50

3.50

3.67

3.33

4.67

Eco-Fees
4.33
2.83
3.33
3.33
4.67
Note. Categories: This policy addresses a real environmental issue; This policy would be
proposed by a state or local government; This policy will have a positive environmental
impact; The projected program costs stated in the policy represent a reasonable
“ballpark” estimate; Implementation o f the policy will result in an increased cost, either
direct or indirect, to the voter. Ratings were done on a scale o f 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
{strongly agree).

PROCEDURE
The experiment was conducted in a single computer-based session. Small groups
o f participants (< 15) independently completed the survey in a campus computer lab.
The measures outlined above were integrated into a single questionnaire using Qualtrics
survey development software. The first page o f the survey was a notification statement
informing the participants o f the general concept o f the study and the rights o f the
participant. The next page asked for the demographic information o f sex and age. After
completing the demographic section, participants read instructions asking them to
imagine that state legislators have placed seven environmental policies on a state ballot
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question. Participants were told that: (1) each o f the policies will result in increased
taxes, (2 ) the estimated costs will be presented with each o f the policies, and ( 3 ) policies
will be enacted if more than half o f total voters approve the policy. Participants were
asked to vote as they would in a real situation.
Participants read the description o f each policy and had to correctly answer two
attention-check questions before proceeding to the vote. These questions assessed
comprehension to assure that the participants had an understanding o f the costs and
benefits o f each policy. Each description was paired with the voting procedure so
participants voted on each policy and indicated the influence o f monetary cost and
environmental benefits before moving onto the next policy. The full policy description
remained available to participants throughout the voting procedure.
After the voting procedure, participants were asked to complete the items
assessing implied endorsement and political affiliation. Political affiliation was presented
last so as to not influence the other measures by activating an ideological schema.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

After data collection was complete, internal consistency o f the ballot question was
found to be below acceptable levels in each condition (a < .495, average inter-item
correlation < . 110). These reliability statistics indicated that votes on one policy were not
related to votes on other policies and using a composite score of total endorsed policies
was not appropriate. Therefore, each policy was analyzed independently using a logistic
regression model. The alpha level for all significance tests was set to .05.
Individual completion times were recorded in order to estimate participants’
adherence to the task instructions and to check for outliers. The total number o f words in
the entire instrument was calculated. Because some instructions were repeated, these
words were not included in the word count. Carver (1992) reported that college students
read at an approximate rate o f 300 words per minute which translates into a minimum
completion time o f 15.5 minutes. Participants who completed the survey in less than
15.5 minutes were excluded from analysis. These 41 participants were reasoned to not
have taken enough time to adequately comprehend the policies and survey instructions.
Further evidence on reading rates suggests that reading on a computer is slower than
reading on paper (Ziefle, 1998), but the 300 word per minute rate maintained a
conservative approach to data cleaning. O f the remaining 227 participants, eight had
completion times that were more than three standard deviations from the mean; therefore,
219 participants were included the final analysis.

Figure 2 displays the proportion o f participants in each condition who voted for
each policy. Logistic regression analysis was performed to test for default effects (see
Table 2).

Logistic regression models displayed significant X values for the green

mileage, compost, and carbon tax policies. Default conditions were dummy-coded with
the forced-choice condition as the reference group. Only the opt-out condition was
significantly different from the forced-choice condition for both the green mileage and
compost policies. No individual predictors were significant when analyzing the carbon
tax policy. These results demonstrated that when a default effect is present the opt-out
condition is driving the effect. The opt-in condition did not significantly change
participants’ preferences relative to the baseline forced-choice condition.

l
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i Opt-out
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E coFee

Figure 2. Proportion of respondents in each default condition who voted for each policy.
Error bars represent ± 1 standard error.
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Table 2
Logistic Regression Analysis_________________________________________________
Policy_____________ X?__________ Wald________ Odds Ratio
95% Cl for Odds
Ratio
Recycling
4.90
Opt-out
1.58
1.99
[0.68, 5.81]
Opt-in
0.76
0.68
[0.29, 1.62]
Green Mileage
9.31*
Opt-out
5.83*
2.35
[1.17, 4.70]
Opt-in
0.05
0.92
[0.45, 1.90]
Lighting
1.60
Opt-out
0.25
0.83
[0.41, 1.70]
Opt-in
1.54
0.65
[0.32, 1.29]
Storm Water
0.16
Opt-out
0.04
0.96
[0.48, 1.93]
Opt-in
0.15
0.87
[0.44, 1.74]
Compost
12.25**
Opt-out
10.01* *
5.46
[1.91, 15.64]
Opt-in
3.52
2.18
[0.97, 4.91]
Carbon Tax
8.05*
Opt-out
1.69
0.19
[0.78, 3.38]
Opt-in
2.07
0.61
[0.31, 1.20]
Eco-Fee
1.40
Opt-out
1.38
1.74
[0.69, 4.38]
ODt-in
0.41
0.52
ro.56. 3.141
Note. * p < . 05; * * p < . 01

All other predictors (i.e., importance of environmental and monetary
considerations, implied policymaker endorsement and political affiliation) did not
demonstrate their expected effects. A univariate analysis o f variance (ANOVA) was
employed to assess significant differences in the influence o f cost and environmental
benefits across conditions. For both analyses, the residuals approached normality.
Levene’s test indicated homogeneity o f variance for both cost, F(2, 216) = 0.28, p = .755,
and environmental benefit, F(2, 216) = 0 3 2 , p = .728. No significant differences were
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observed on the reported importance o f environmental benefits, F (2, 216) = 0.04, p =
.960, rj2< .001, or cost, F(2, 216) = 1.88,p = .155, r\2 = .017 (see Table 2).

Table 3
ANOVA Results for the Influence o f Cost and Environmental Benefits
SS
df
MS
F
Cost
Condition
56812.15
2
28406.07
1 .8 8
Error
3264284.47
216
15112.43
Total
3321096.61
218
Environment
Condition
1043.40
Error
2733945.92
Total
2734989.32

2

216
218

521.70
12657.16

0.04

Across all conditions, participants rated the environmental benefits as more
influential than the monetary costs /(218) = 7.76, p < .001, d - .730. The environmental
benefits were more influential for every policy except green mileage (see Table 4).
Participants in each condition found the cost to be more influential when voting on the
green mileage policy.
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Table 4
Influence o f Policy Costs and Environmental Benefits (0 - 100)
Opt-out
Opt-in
Forced Choice
M( S D)
M(SD)
M( SD)
Policv
Recycling
51.6 (27.1)
48.1 (27.0)
52.8 (24.0)
Cost
77.1 (19.2)
75.2 (20.8)
74.6 (21.6)
Benefit
Green Mileage
63.1 (26.6)
Cost
63.1 (26.6)
60.5 (30.7)
60.4 (26.4)
Benefit
56.5 (25.5)
51.5 (26.5)
Lighting
59.1 (25.7)
50.9 (26.7)
56.5 (24.7)
Cost
63.5 (24.8)
66.5 (26.7)
Benefit
6 6 . 0 (26.8)
Storm Water
57.7 (26.2)
56.4 (26.7)
Cost
59.2 (24.8)
66.5 (22.4)
61.2 (24.9)
Benefit
66.0 (23.9)
Compost
50.3 (27.7)
55.9 (24.6)
52.3 (25.8)
Cost
72.5 (20.7)
73.7(17.7)
76.3 (21.2)
Benefit
Carbon Tax
51.6 (29.4)
56.3 (26.9)
Cost
59.2 (27.3)
65.4 (24.1)
Benefit
62.7 (26.2)
65.5 (25.9)
Eco-Fee
46.2 (27.4)
51.4 (28.5)
54.9 (27.5)
Cost
72.6 (25.0)
73.6 (21.7)
74.9 (22.0)
Benefit
Total
57.3 (17.0)
Cost
52.0(18.8)
56.7 (16.7)
67.6
116.8)
Benefit
68.2 0 5 .7 )
67.4 0 5 .7 )

ANOVA was used to assess differences in perceived policymaker endorsement.
Residuals approached normality and Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of
homogeneity o f variance was met, F(2, 216) = 0.62, p = .541. Participants in each
default condition perceived roughly the same endorsement from the policymakers, F(2,
216) = 0.03, p = .970,

T]2

< .001. Also, political affiliation did not predict votes for any

policy ( p ’s > .05) using logistic regression analysis. Because neither the measures o f
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reference dependence nor implied endorsement differed across conditions, Hypothesis 4
was not tested and is not discussed further.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION

DEFAULT EFFECTS
The decision making literature has indicated default effects to be a robust
phenomenon and the results o f the current study partially support their existence in the
context o f environmental policies (Hypothesis 1). When voting for a policy that would
tax individuals based on energy usage, the default option was a significant predictor o f
the participant’s response. Additionally, participants were more likely to vote in favor of
a green mileage and compost policy when the default vote was in favor o f the policy
rather than not in favor o f the policy. Votes for policies regarding a recycling program,
energy efficient lighting standards, improved storm water systems, and eco-fees were
unaffected by the default option.
One possible explanation for why only three policies displayed default effects is
that participants were unfamiliar with these three policies. The communities surrounding
the university where the research was conducted have municipal recycling programs,
charge a fee for the upkeep o f storm water systems, and some local industries apply ecofees (e.g., tire dealers charge a fee for the proper disposal o f old tires). Currently these
communities do not have any policies in place regarding a carbon tax, green mileage fee,
or compost program. Previous research has reported that the selection o f the default
option increases as outcome uncertainty increases (see Anderson, 2003 for a review).
This principle could explain why default effects were only present for unfamiliar policies.
If participants were unfamiliar with the carbon tax, green mileage, and compost program
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policies then one could assume that the participants were uncertain o f the policy
outcomes. This uncertainty might have led to the selection o f the default option.
Alternatively, the familiar policies could be associated with familiar outcomes.
Therefore, participants would be more willing to deviate from the default option when
voting for these policies. Future studies should measure familiarity/certainty in order to
verify this explanation.
OPT-IN VERSUS OPT-OUT
O f the three policies which demonstrated statistically significant default effects,
only the opt-out default condition was significantly different from the forced-choice
condition. This finding supports an endowment account o f default effects. One outcome
o f the endowment effect is that individuals require more money to sell a good in their
possession than they would pay to purchase the same good. In terms o f the current study,
participants would need more money to give up the environmental benefits o f a policy
than others would be willing to pay in order to pass the policy. The opt-out condition is
different than the opt-in and forced-choice conditions in one important way. Doing
nothing alters the status quo in the opt-out condition but not in the other two. Participants
are not already in “possession” o f the environmental benefits in the opt-in and forcedchoice conditions. Therefore, participants in both o f these conditions must ask how much
they are willing to pay for the environmental benefits. Because WTP < WTA,
participants in the opt-in and forced-choice conditions were less likely to endorse the
policy than participants in the opt-out condition. This result is supported by the reference
dependence account o f the default effect. The endowment effect is a byproduct o f
reference dependence which provides partial support for Hypothesis 3. This endowment
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account o f default effects aligns with the findings o f Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008)
who found that participants required more money to relinquish environmental benefits
than they were willing to pay for those same benefits. Previous research on reference
dependence and green defaults has focused on consumer products with tangible outcomes
(Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008; Dinner et al., 2011). One distinguishing component of
the current study is that the default effect is examined at the policy level. The findings
from this experiment indicate that policy decisions may be susceptible to the same
influences as consumer decision making.
COST VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
As stated above, the observed pattern o f default effects supports the endowment
effect but the explicit measures o f cost and environmental influence do not. Participants
did not report differences in the influence o f cost or environmental benefits across
conditions. Hypothesis 3, which stated that the influence o f the monetary costs and
environmental benefits would differ across conditions, was not supported by this
measure.
The lack o f support for Hypothesis 3 has multiple possible explanations. On
average, participants rated the environmental benefits as more influential in their decision
making process than the cost associated with each policy. The green mileage policy was
the only individual policy in which participants across conditions rated the cost as more
influential them the environmental benefits. The green mileage policy was also the most
expensive and was endorsed by the fewest participants. Figure 2 shows that the green
mileage policy did not gamer a majority o f votes in any condition (the opt-out default
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condition was split exactly at 50%)— the only policy to do so. Cost appeared to have a
negative effect on policy endorsement across all conditions.
Participants were specifically instructed to indicate how important the cost was to
their decision, not just their opinion o f the policy’s value. These results show that
participants only considered cost to be more influential than environmental benefits when
cost was high. When costs were low participants were m ore focused on the
environmental benefits. Perhaps costs are negligible when they are below a specific
threshold. Interestingly, Aldy, Kotchen, and Leiserowitz (2012) found that the average
American is willing to pay $162 per year in higher electricity bills to help the
environment. The green mileage policy was the only policy with an estimated annual
cost greater than $162.
Another possible explanation for the relative unimportance o f policies’ monetary
cost is delay discounting. Delay or hyperbolic discounting states that individuals
generally prefer immediate gains and delayed losses (Thaler, 1981). Stating annual costs
instead o f immediate costs might have given the impression that participants would not
suffer any financial loss until sometime in the future. Delaying payment would thereby
lessen the impact o f the cost.
IMPLIED ENDORSEMENT
Participants did not perceive different levels o f policymaker endorsement across
conditions; Hypothesis 2 was not supported. The fact that participants did not differ in
their levels o f policymaker endorsement was not expected, although this effect was
expected to be smaller than the reference dependence explanation. The proposed policies
had already made it to a ballot so participants may have felt that policymakers in each
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condition supported the policies by putting them to a vote. Additionally, the default
option may have been seen as a part o f the ballot system and unrelated to the wishes o f
the policymakers. Moreover, previous research on implied endorsement has asked
participants to explicitly consider the consequences of the default option. While
individuals have shown that they perceive recommendations in default options
(McKenzie et al., 2006), no evidence suggests that these recommendations lead to a
preference for that option. This study suggests that, at least on an explicit level, implied
policymaker endorsement has no effect on preferences for environmental policies.
LIM ITA TIO N S
Given the nature o f the experimental task, the use o f a student sample likely
affected the results and limited the study’s generalizability. The current study depended
on an ostensible voting scenario. A large proportion o f the participants were 18 years old
when the data was collected in the summer and fall o f 2013. Many o f these students may
have never participated in an election. Furthermore, the youth of the participants may
have limited their understanding o f the financial consequences presented in each
scenario. For example, if the students were not familiar with paying storm water fees in
the past then the implications o f a fee increase may not have been fully understood.
Additionally, the task may have been too artificial for participants to actually appreciate
the effect o f the losses. Voting for a policy in a lab is much different from a true scenario
in which real money is involved.
The policies in the current study were meant to reflect a high level o f external
validity. Each policy was based on realistic estimates o f costs and benefits while
sacrificing internal validity. The heterogeneous costs and benefits among policies may
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have added too much unexplained variability to the outcomes, thereby obscuring
statistical significance.
Finally, measuring the role o f loss aversion in default effects relied on explicit
measures (i.e., participants were directly asked how the cost and environmental impacts
influenced their decisions). Upon review, these items could be susceptible to a social
desirability bias. Participants may have wanted to be viewed as charitable or generous
which would explain the greater reported influence o f environmental impacts compared
to costs. Given the subject matter, this effect may have especially prevalent. Research
has shown that people are more likely to buy green products in public and that “going
green” can be motivated by social status and reputation (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den
Bergh, 2010). Having small groups o f peers complete the survey at the same time may
have exacerbated the desire to be environmentally conscious. Future research should
incorporate less obvious items often used in the study o f the endowment effect.
Measures o f willingness to pay and willingness to accept (Carmon & Ariely, 2000;
Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) may produce a more genuine measure o f the effect o f
loss aversion.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The current study focused on one particular aspect o f constructed preferences—
default effects. However, many other factors have been shown to elicit economically
irrational behavior. One particular line o f research relevant to environmental policies is
intertemporal choice (i.e., decisions with payoffs and losses at different points in time).
Research has demonstrated that future gains and losses are not evaluated in the same
manner as immediate gains and losses (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Frederick,
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Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Green & Myerson, 1996; Thaler, 1981). The
rewards o f environmental policies are almost always distributed across time. For
example, consumers will not reap immediate rewards by purchasing energy efficient light
bulbs, but over time the environmental and economic rewards will start to add up. The
way in which these future costs and benefits are communicated to voters and consumers
will presumably impact their preferences. Future research should examine how these
effects alter preferences.
The finding that default effects differed among policies is another avenue for
future research. Although a link between familiarity and certainty o f environmental
policy costs and benefits was presented here, this connection is in need o f further
investigation. Additionally, the current experiment tried to reflect a reasonable estimate
o f externally valid policies. Using such diverse policies has created a challenge o f
finding an underlying factor structure. Future research should aim to identify the factors
o f each policy and how those factors influence the decision making process. The current
study tried to isolate two broad categories of cost and environmental benefits, but a more
finely tuned approach is needed.
Along with identifying underlying differences among policies, an alternate line of
research would attempt to identify individual differences among voters. Socioeconomic
status, for example, may be associated with voting behaviors. The participants in the
current study were all college students so the impact and immediacy o f these policies
may be perceived differently relative to individuals with different economic or
educational backgrounds.

Although the influence o f monetary and environmental factors did not display the
expected effect in the current study, future research should examine how these two
factors interact. Implementing a willingness to pay versus willingness to accept
paradigm, as mentioned above, will help determine the relative value o f each factor on
voter behavior. Specifically, these studies would help policymakers determine how much
voters are willing to pay for differing degrees of environmental protection/benefit.
Finally, the political affiliation o f policymakers should be investigated. The
current study did not find a perceived difference in implied policymaker endorsement,
but the boundaries o f implied endorsement should be further examined. Perhaps making
traits o f policymakers more salient to voters will have a greater influence on how voters
make their decision. Brown and Krishna (2004) predicted a reversal o f default effects
when consumers are given knowledge about the company who established the default.
By explicitly stating which political party member has determined the default option, the
opposing party’s voters might purposefully choose against the default option while the
voters with the same party affiliation may be more apt to adopt the default. This method
would evoke the participants’ political schema which may be a necessary factor for
implied endorsement to have an effect.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

For some environmental policies, voting scenarios which enact the policy by
default (voters must opt out) led to a higher level o f endorsement than a forced-choice or
opt-in policy which partially confirmed Hypothesis 1. Explicit measures o f the effects o f
loss aversion and implied endorsement could not explain the default effect which did not
support Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, for those policies demonstrating default effects,
the pattern o f results supported an endowment account (and reference dependence by
proxy) o f default effects. This endowment effect shows that processes affecting
consumer behavior may also be driving voting behavior. Future research should examine
other aspects o f constructed preferences in the context o f environmental policy as well as
determining the individual and policy factors which drive voting behavior.
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APPENDIX
POLICY DESCRIPTIONS

Taxpayer funded recycling program: Your city is no longer able to fully fund a program
for the proper collection and disposal o f recyclable products (plastic bottles, mixed paper,
aluminum cans, etc.). In order to continue the government run program, your city is
charging a monthly fee that exclusively covers all costs associated with the operation and
maintenance o f a residential recycling program. Each year these fees will total $35.

Green mileage fee: Automobiles are a major source of pollution and greenhouse gas
emission. A tax is being proposed that charges a fee based on the number o f miles
driven. This fee would be assessed at different rates based on the environmental impact
o f the vehicle. For example, a hybrid electric vehicle would be taxed at a lower rate than
a gasoline fueled sport utility vehicle. Based on current data, the average annual rate for
such a tax would be $180 per year. The revenue from these fees would be used to help
develop cleaner forms o f transportation.

Energy efficient lighting: Light emitting diode (LED) light bulbs are the most energy
efficient bulbs on the market today. LEDs produce the same amount o f light as
incandescent and compact fluorescent light (CFL) bulbs, but require considerably less
energy to do so. The increased energy efficiency means a reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions. The Virginia government is altering the federal Energy Independence and
Security Act o f 2007 to incorporate LED technology. Under the amended Act, all
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households would be required to exclusively use LED bulbs by year 2021. The average
consumer would need to spend $75 annually to meet these new standards in the allotted
time.

Storm water fees: As the name suggests, storm water refers to the water that results from
precipitation. The water that does not soak into the ground ends up carrying many
pollutants into the areas natural waterways. To combat this pollution and control
flooding, the cities o f Hampton Roads have established storm water management
systems. These systems are paid for by “storm water fees” that are charged to residents.
Fees vary by city, but imagine that the current storm water fee for your city is $95 per
year. This is the average yearly fee across the Hampton Roads area. City managers are
planning an upgrade to the system that would decrease waterway pollution by an
additional 15%. To pay for the upgrade, residents will have to pay an additional $12 per
year.

Compost: Food scraps and lawn trimmings account for 27% of the waste in U.S.
landfills. However, the majority o f these materials can be composted. Composting is the
process breaking down organic material into a soil-like substance that can be used to
strengthen soil or grow plants. The use o f compost reduces the reliance on potentially
hazardous chemical fertilizers which runoff into natural waterways, remediates
contaminated soil, decreases pollution created by landfills, and much more. Your city is
planning a compost collection service. Yard trimmings and kitchen scraps would be
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collected weekly, much like a curbside recycling program. The cost o f implementing and
maintaining such a program would cost each household $23 per year.

Carbon tax: City officials want to implement a tax based on energy usage. This program
would affect all households that use electricity, but reduced rates would be granted to
users o f “green energy” sources such as solar or wind power. The fee (or “carbon tax”)
would be added to each resident’s utility bill. Funds would be used by the city to develop
eco-friendly initiatives and help reduce greenhouse gas emissions. An average resident
would pay $ 16 per year for this carbon tax.

Eco-fees: Many items that end up in landfills are not properly discarded. A product may
not be readily recycled by the current recycling program, or hazardous materials are not
disposed o f in a safe manner. For example, automobile tires can be recycled but they are
not accepted by municipal curbside programs. Similarly, antifreeze that is sent to the
landfill can seep into the soil, polluting groundwater and harming wildlife. The state
government has proposed a program o f Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) to fight
these harmful effects. EPR mandates that manufacturers or importers o f certain materials
are responsible for setting up a recycling program to recover the waste at the end o f the
product life. For example, tire manufacturers are responsible for creating easily
accessible programs to recycle old tires. The proposed law would initially only affect the
manufacturers o f motor oil, antifreeze, tires, paint, and aerosol cans. Because these
manufacturers must pay for the new recycling programs, they would presumably pass
these costs onto the consumer. When consumers purchased one o f the designated
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products, an “eco-fee” would be added to their bill. This new law would result in the
average consumer paying

$ 1 0

more per year.
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